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Abstract— Binary hypothesis testing under the Neyman-
Pearson formalism is a statistical inference framework for dis-
tinguishing data generated by two different source distributions.
Privacy restrictions may require the curator of the data or
the data respondents themselves to share data with the test
only after applying a randomizing privacy mechanism. Using
mutual information as the privacy metric and the relative
entropy between the two distributions of the output (post-
randomization) source classes as the utility metric (motivated
by the Chernoff-Stein Lemma), this work focuses on finding an
optimal mechanism that maximizes the chosen utility function
while ensuring that the mutual information based leakage
for both source distributions is bounded. Focusing on the
high privacy regime, an Euclidean information-theoretic (E-IT)
approximation to the tradeoff problem is presented. It is shown
that the solution to the E-IT approximation is independent of
the alphabet size and clarifies that a mutual information based
privacy metric preserves the privacy of the source symbols in
inverse proportion to their likelihood.
Index Terms— Binary hypothesis testing, Privacy, Euclidean
information theory
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of large datasets to test two or more hypotheses
(e.g., the 1% theory of income distribution in the United
States) relies on the classical statistical inference framework
of binary (or more generally M -ary) hypothesis testing.
In particular, binary hypothesis testing under the Neyman-
Pearson setup is used to distinguish data generated by two
different source classes. However, privacy restrictions may
require the curator of the data or the data respondents
themselves to share data with the test only after applying a
randomizing privacy mechanism chosen to ensure that some
measure of statistical utility is achieved while simultaneously
guaranteeing some measure of privacy.
In this paper, we study this problem of designing a privacy
mechanism when the privacy metric is quantified by the
mutual information (average leakage) of a source class and
its randomized output and the utility metric is quantified
by the relative entropy of the output (post-randomization)
distributions for the two source classes. The resulting utility-
privacy tradeoff problem involves maximizing the relative
entropy subject to constraints on information leakage for both
source classes memoryless mappings, i.e., conditional prob-
ability matrices between the input and output distributions.
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The resulting optimization problem involves maximizing a
convex function over a convex set which is, in general,
NP-hard. We approximate the tradeoff problem in the high
privacy regime (near zero leakage) using techniques from
Euclidean information theory (E-IT); these techniques have
found use in developing capacity results in [1], [2]. Our
results show that the solution to the E-IT approximation
is independent of the alphabet size and that a mutual in-
formation based privacy metric exploits the source statistics
and preserves the privacy of the source symbols in inverse
proportions to their likelihoods.
Related work: The problem of designing privacy mech-
anisms for hypothesis testing has recently gained interest.
Kairouz et al. [3] show that the optimal locally differential
privacy (L-DP) mechanism has a staircase form and can be
obtained as a solution of a linear program. Li and Ocheter-
ing [4] considered the problem of an adversarial smart
meter data collector interested in learning private behavior
of consumers via a hypothesis test with the goal of finding
the optimal power consumption policy at the consumer to
limit such inference. Our problem differs from both these
efforts in using mutual information as the privacy metric. It
is worth noting that the L-DP formulation in [3] by its very
definition of requiring the mechanism to limit distinction
between any two letters of the source alphabet for a given
output is focused on the high privacy regime—the authors
exploit a specific sub-linear function of the relative entropy
function to simplify the tradeoff problem to a linear program.
In contrast, the E-IT approximation we use leads to a convex
program for which we present closed-form solutions.
II. NOTATION
We use bold capital letters to represent matrices, e.g. X
is a matrix with the ith row (column) indexed as Xi and
the entry at the ith row jth column indexed as Xij ; and
use bold lower case letters to represent vectors, e.g. x is
a vector with the ith entry indexed as xi; and denote sets
by capital calligraphic letters, e.g., X . For vectors a and b,
as well as functions f and g,
[ f(a)
g(b)
]
is a diagonal matrix
with the ith diagonal entry being f(ai)g(bi) , e.g., the diagonal
matrix [ a
2√
b
] has diagonal entries a
2
i√
bi
. We denote the l2-
norm of a vector x by ‖x‖. Throughout, probability mass
functions are denoted as row vectors, e.g., p. D denotes
relative entropy and I denotes mutual information. We can
write the mutual information between two random variables
or between a probability distribution and the corresponding
conditional probability matrix, e.g. for two random variables
X, Xˆ with X ∼ p and Xˆ|{X = x} ∼ PXˆ|X=x, the mutual
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information is denoted as I(X; Xˆ) or I(p,PXˆ|X).
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the binary hypothesis testing framework
that distinguishes between two independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) discrete source classes. Let Xn =
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) denote the sequence of n random vari-
ables to be used for hypothesis testing, where entries Xi ∈
X , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} are drawn i.i.d. according to a prob-
ability distribution p, such that its realization xn is the
available data. The two hypotheses are H1 : p = p1 and
H2 : p = p2. Let A(n)1 and A(n)2 =
(A(n)1 )c be the decision
regions in Xn, such that from the Neyman-Pearson lemma,
A(n)1 =
{
xn : p1(x
n)
p2(xn)
> T
}
, where T is the threshold for
the likelihood ratio test. Furthermore, let β(n)1 and β
(n)
2 be the
probabilities of error, such that type-I error β(n)1 (resp. type-
II error β(n)2 ) is the probability of error from choosing H2
(resp. H1) when xn is generated by p1 (resp. p2). From the
Chernoff-Stein lemma [5, Chap. 11], for a desired β(n)1 < δ
(where δ > 0), i.e., bounding the probability of declaring
that the test sequence xn is from p2 when p1 is true, the
type-II error exponent of minimal β(n)2 , denoted as β
(n)
2 (δ),
is limn→∞− 1n log β(n)2 (δ) = D(p1‖p2) independent of δ.
In most data collection and classification applications,
there may be an additional requirement to ensure that the
data while providing utility does not leak information about
the respondents of the data. This in turn implies that the
data provided to the hypothesis test is not the same as the
original data, but instead a randomized version that ensures
some measures of privacy (information leakage) and utility.
Specifically, we use mutual information as a measure of a
stochastic information leakage between the input sequence
and the randomized output sequence used by the test. The
goal is to find the randomizing mapping, henceforth referred
to a privacy mechanism, such that a measure of utility of the
data is maximized while ensuring that the mutual information
based leakages for all source classes are bounded.
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the source distri-
butions are i.i.d.; furthermore, modeling the large dataset
problem, we assume that the length of the data sequence n
is large. In the absence of a privacy mechanism, asymptotic
results of the binary hypothesis testing problem exploit the
i.i.d. nature of the sources. Preserving the utility of the
data usually requires preserving its i.i.d. property, and thus,
we assume that the randomizing privacy mechanism for
the hypothesis testing problem considered here is an i.i.d.
mechanism. Let W, an M × N conditional probability
matrix, denote the privacy mechanism which maps the M
letters of the input alphabet X to N ≤ M letters of the
output alphabet Xˆ . The assumption N ≤M implies that we
map the input probability distribution to a simplex with at
most the same cardinality. Thus, the i.i.d. sequence Xn ∼
pk, k ∈ {1, 2}, is mapped to an output sequence Xˆn whose
entries Xˆj ∈ Xˆ for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N} are i.i.d. with the
distribution pkW. Thus the hypothesis test is now performed
on a sequence Xˆn that belongs to one of two source classes
with distributions1 p1W and p2W, respectively. For the two
i.i.d. source classes, the type-II error exponent of the test now
is limn→∞− 1n log β(n)2 (δ) = D(p1W‖p2W).
To design an appropriate privacy mechanism, we wish
to maximize the error exponent D(p1W‖p2W) subject
to the following leakage constraints: I(p1,W) ≤ 1 and
I(p2,W) ≤ 2. Formally, the utility-privacy tradeoff prob-
lem is that finding the optimal privacy mechanism W∗, i.e.,
the optimal solution of the following optimization problem:
max
W
D(p1W‖p2W)
s.t. I(p1,W) ≤ 1
I(p2,W) ≤ 2
(1)
where 1 ∈ [0, H(p1)] and 2 ∈ [0, H(p2)] are the permissi-
ble upper bounds of the privacy leakages for the two source
classes. The problem in (1) maximizes a convex objective
function over a convex feasible region, thus, its optimal
solutions are on the boundary of the feasible region. When
the feasible region is a polytope, closed-form expressions
for the optimal solution and objective can potentially be
computed. However, the region bounded by the two mutual
information constraints is not a polytope. While there exist
computational methods to obtain a solution that approximate
the feasible region by an intersection of polytopes [6], our
focus is on developing a meaningful approximation for the
problem in (1) in specific privacy or utility regimes.
To this end, we focus on developing approximations of (1).
One possible regime to use an approximation approach is the
high privacy regime, i.e., 0 ≤ k  min(H(p1), H(p2))
for all k ∈ {1, 2}. In this regime, one can use Taylor
series expansions to approximate both the objective function
and the constraints. Such approximations to the relative
entropy and the mutual information were first considered
in [7, Theorem 4.1]. More recently, analyses based on such
approximations, referred to as Euclidean Information Theory
(E-IT), have been found to be useful in a variety of graphical
model learning [8] and network information theory problems
[1][2]. In the following section, we detail the approximation
problem and the corresponding closed-form solution.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we summarize all main results. Our first
result captures the mapping of the utility-privacy tradeoff
problem in (1) to an Euclidean information-theoretic (E-
IT) approximation problem. Our second result summarizes a
closed-form result for the E-IT approximation problem while
our last result introduces the approximate solution for (1)
based on the solution of the E-IT approximation problem.
Without loss of generality, all our results are presented for
the case of |Xˆ | = M , i.e., the size of output alphabet is the
same as the input alphabet. We highlight in the sequel how
the method can be used for |Xˆ | = N < M .
Proposition 1: In the high privacy regime with 0 ≤ k 
min(H(p1), H(p2)), k ∈ {1, 2}, the privacy mechanism
1We remind that the distribution p1W is the output distribution induced
by the input p and the privacy mechanism (transition matrix) W.
W is chosen as a perturbation of a perfect privacy (1 =
2 = 0) achieving mechanism W0, i.e., W = W0 + Θ.
The mechanism W0 is a rank-1 matrix with every row
being equal to a row vector w0 whose entries w0j satisfy∑M
j=1 w0j = 1 and w0j > 0, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. The
perturbation matrix Θ is an M × M matrix with entries
Θij satisfying
∑M
j=1 Θij = 0 and |Θij | ≤ ρw0j , for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. For this perturbation model, the utility-
privacy tradeoff problem in (1) can be approximated as
max
Θ
1
2
∥∥(p1 − p2)Θ[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2
s.t.
1
2
M∑
i=1
p1i
∥∥Θi[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2 ≤ 1;
1
2
M∑
i=1
p2i
∥∥Θi[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2 ≤ 2.
M∑
j=1
Θij = 0, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
(2)
where pki, for k = 1, 2, is the ith entry of pk, Θi is the
ith row of Θ, and [(w0)−
1
2 ] is a diagonal matrix with ith
diagonal entry, for all i, being (w0i)−
1
2 . For ease of analysis,
setting A = Θ[(w0)−
1
2 ], (2) can be rewritten as
max
A
1
2
(p1 − p2)AAT (p1 − p2)T
s.t.
1
2
M∑
i=1
p1iAiA
T
i ≤ 1
1
2
M∑
i=1
p2iAiA
T
i ≤ 2
A(
√
w0)
T = 0.
(3)
Remark 1: The approximation problems in (2) and (3)
result from the observation that both the relative entropy
and mutual information can be approximated by the χ2
divergence in the high privacy (low leakage) regime. Thus,
the problem simplifies to maximizing a quadratic objective
function with quadratic constraints, whose optimal solution is
a perturbation matrix Θ∗ = A∗
[
(
√
w0)
]
and A∗ optimizes
the problem in (3).
Theorem 1: The optimization problem in (3) reduces to
one with a vector variable α ∈ RM×1 as
max
α
1
2
α(p1 − p2)T (p1 − p2)αT
s.t.
1
2
α[p1]α
T ≤ 1
1
2
α[p2]α
T ≤ 2,
(4)
where the absolute value of the ith entry αi of α, for all
i ∈ {1, ..,M}, is the Euclidean norm of the ith row Ai of
A. The M ×M matrix A∗ optimizing (3) is obtained from
the optimal solution α∗ of (4) as a rank-1 matrix whose ith
row, for all i, is given by α∗iv where α
∗
i is the i
th entry of
α∗, and v is a unit norm vector that is orthogonal to
√
w0,
such that
A∗ = (α∗)Tv (5)
v(
√
w0)
T = 0 (6)
‖v‖ = 1. (7)
Remark 2: Theorem 1 results from exploiting the struc-
ture of the QCQP problem in (3) to further restrict the matrix
A to a vector α as shown in the sequel.
Theorem 2: An optimal privacy mechanism W′ for the
E-IT approximation problem in (2) is
W′ = W0 + (α∗)Tv ·
[√
w0
]
(8)
where W0 is given by Proposition 1, v is chosen to satisfy
(6) and (7), and for λ∗ = ‖p1 − p2‖2 and v∗ = p1−p2‖p1−p2‖
being the eigenvalue and eigenvector, respectively, of (p1 −
p2)
T (p1−p2), the optimal solution, α∗, of (4) is given as:
1) if only the first constraint in (4) is active,
v∗
[
p2
(p1)2
]
(v∗)T
v∗
[
(p1)−1
]
(v∗)T
<
2
1
, (9)
and the optimal solution α∗ is
α∗ = ±
√
21
v∗
[
(p1)−1
]
(v∗)T
v∗
[
(p1)
−1]; (10)
2) if only the second constraint in (4) is active,
v∗
[
p1
(p2)2
]
(v∗)T
v∗
[
(p2)−1
]
(v∗)T
<
1
2
, (11)
and the optimal solution α∗ is
α∗ = ±
√
22
v∗
[
(p2)−1
]
(v∗)T
v∗
[
(p2)
−1]; (12)
3) when both constraints in (4) are active, the optimal
solution α∗ is
α∗ = ±λ
∗
2
v∗
(
η∗1
[
p1
]
+ η∗2
[
p2
])−1
(13)
where η∗1 > 0 and η
∗
2 > 0 satisfy
v∗
[
p1
](
η∗1
[
p1
]
+ η∗2
[
p2
])−2
(v∗)T =
81
(λ∗)2
(14)
v∗
[
p2
](
η∗1
[
p1
]
+ η∗2
[
p2
])−2
(v∗)T =
82
(λ∗)2
(15)
Remark 3: Note that the optimal mechanism W′ = W0+
(α∗)Tv
[√
w0
]
, via α∗, captures the fact that a statistical
privacy metric, such as mutual information, takes into consid-
eration the source distribution in designing the (perturbation
Θ∗) mechanism. In fact, the solutions for α∗ in (10), (12)
and (13) capture this through the term
(
η∗1 [p1] + η
∗
2 [p2]
)−1
.
The vector v∗ indicates the direction along which the ob-
jective function, i.e., the relative entropy, grows fastest. See
Fig. 1 for an illustration of the result in Theorem 2. Note
that from (10), (12) and (13) for a uniformly distributed
source, i.e., the entries of p1 or p2 are 1M , all entries of v
∗
have the same scaling such that α∗ is in the direction of v∗.
Fig. 1: Illustration of (8). The “nominal” row vector w0 is
perturbed in different directions depending on α∗ and v.
However, for a source with non-uniform distributed samples,
the samples with low probabilities affect the direction of
v∗
(
η∗1 [p1]+η
∗
2 [p2]
)−1
the most. This is a direct consequence
of the statistical leakage metric which causes the optimal
mechanism to minimize information leakage by perturbing
the low probability (more informative) samples proportion-
ately more relative to the higher probability samples.
V. PROOFS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we develop the E-IT approximation of the
utility-privacy tradeoff problem in (1) and present the proofs
for Proposition 1, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Section IV.
To develop an approximation using Taylor series, we select
an operating point which will be perturbed in order to provide
an approximately optimal privacy mechanism. Since our
focus is on the high privacy regime 1, 2 ∈ [0, ∗], ∗ 
min(H(p1), H(p2)), we present the approximation around
a perfect privacy operation point, i.e., a privacy mechanism
W0 that achieves 1 = 2 = 0 leakage. The following lemma
summarizes the set of all mechanisms that achieve perfect
privacy.
Lemma 1: For perfect privacy, i.e., 1 = 2 = 0, the pri-
vacy mechanism W0 is a rank-1 matrix with every row being
equal to a row vector w0 where w0 belongs to probability
simplex, such that the entries w0j , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} of the
vector w0 satisfy
N∑
j=1
w0j = 1, and (16)
w0j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (17)
Proof: For any probability distribution p with entries
pi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, and a privacy mechanism W, the mutual
information I(p,W) can be written as
I(p,W) =
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
piWij log
Wij∑M
i=1 piWij
(18)
≥
M∑
i=1
pi
( N∑
j=1
Wij
)
log
∑N
j=1Wij∑N
j=1
∑M
i=1 piWij
(19)
=
M∑
i=1
pi
N∑
j=1
Wij log
1
1
= 0 (20)
where (19) results from the log-sum inequality. Equality in
(19) holds if and only if [5, Theorem 2.7.1]
Wij =
M∑
k=1
pkWkj , i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (21)
In other words, perfect privacy, i.e., zero leakage, is achieved
when every row of the optimal mechanism W0 is the same
and is equal to the probability distribution w0 = pW0.
Thus, for the perfect privacy setting, the optimal mechanism
satisfying (21) is a perfectly noisy mechanism, such that the
input distribution has no effect on the output.
Remark 4: Note that, for any W0 satisfying (21) that
achieves perfect privacy, the utility is D(p1W0‖p2W0) =
0. Furthermore, the rows of W0, i.e., w0, can take any value
in an M– dimensional probability simplex, i.e., w0 can have
any k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} non-zero columns. This implies that
perfect privacy, and hence, zero utility, can be achieved for
any cardinality of the output from 1 to M .
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 presents an E-IT approximation of the
utility-privacy tradeoff problem (1) in the high privacy
regime where the privacy mechanism W is modeled in (22)-
(24). The proof of the proposition is as follows.
Proof: Consider the high privacy regime in which 0 ≤
k  min(H(p1), H(p2)), k ∈ {1, 2}. In this regime, for
a feasible (1, 2) pair the privacy mechanism W can be
written as a perturbation of W0 via
W = W0 + Θ (22)
where W0 is a mechanism achieving perfect privacy (i.e.,
satisfies (21)) with all rows equal to w0, where w0 is chosen
such that its entries w0j 6= 0,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and Θ is a
matrix with
N∑
j=1
Θij = 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} (23)
|Θij | ≤ ρw0j ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (24)
where the radius of the neighborhood around w0 is ρ∈ [0, 1).
Note that (23) results from the requirement that W is
stochastic, i.e., the rows of W sum to 1. Since the rows of
W0 also sum to 1, we obtain (23). The constraint in (24)
captures the fact that approximating about a perfect privacy
achieving mechanism requires restricting the entries of the
perturbation matrix Θ to be within a fraction ρ of w0.
The perturbation modeled in (22)-(24) implies that every
row in W as well as the output distribution p1W and p2W
are in a neighborhood about w0 given by∣∣∣Wij − w0j∣∣∣ ≤ ρw0j , (25a)∣∣∣(p1W)j − w0j∣∣∣ ≤ ρw0j , (25b)∣∣∣(p2W)j − w0j∣∣∣ ≤ ρw0j , (25c)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In this
neighborhood, we can approximate the relative entropy using
Taylor series about W0 as
D(p1W‖p2W)
=
1
2
N∑
j=1
(∑M
i=1 p1iΘij −
∑M
i=1 p2iΘij
)2∑M
i=1 p1iWij
+ o
(∥∥∥(p1 − p2)Θ[(p1W)− 12 ]∥∥∥2∞
)
(26)
≈ 1
2
∥∥∥(p1 − p2)Θ[(p1W)− 12 ]∥∥∥2 (27)
≈ 1
2
∥∥(p1 − p2)Θ[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2, (28)
where (27) results from approximating the relative entropy
by the χ2-divergence term [7, Theorem 4.1], and (28) results
from applying the neighborhood condition in (25b).
Similarly, one can approximate the mutual information
between the source class k ∈ {1, 2} and its output as
I(pk,W)
=
1
2
M∑
i=1
pki
( N∑
j=1
(
Wij −
∑M
i=1 pkiWij
)2
Wij
+ o
(∥∥∥(Wi − pkW)[(Wi)− 12 ]∥∥∥2∞)
)
(29)
≈ 1
2
M∑
i=1
pki
∥∥∥(Wi − pkW)[(Wi)− 12 ]∥∥∥2 (30)
≈ 1
2
M∑
i=1
pki
∥∥(w0 + Θi − pkW)[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2 (31)
≈ 1
2
M∑
i=1
pki
∥∥Θi[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2, (32)
where Wi and Θi are the ith rows of W and Θ, respectively.
With these E-IT approximations of the relative entropy and
the mutual information, the utility-privacy tradeoff problem
in (1) is approximated as (2). Let A be a matrix with entries
Aij =
Θij√
w0j
, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (33)
From (23), we have that A(
√
w0)
T = 0, where
√
w0 is the
vector whose entries are the square root of the entries of w0.
Thus, the approximation in (2) leads to (3).
Remark 5: The row vector w0 can have any k ∈
{1, . . . ,M} non-zero columns, i.e., it can be any point in
an M–dimensional simplex including extremal/corner points.
From (24), this implies that the columns of Θ that are non-
zero are those for which w0j are non-zero. Without loss of
generality, we assume that M = N and that w0 is chosen in
the interior of the simplex. The results apply for any N < M .
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Note that in the optimization problem (3) the first two
constraints only depend on the Euclidean norm of the rows
of A. On the other hand, AAT in the objective function
includes all possible inner products of any two rows of A.
Based on the special structure, we can simplify the problem
in (3) to obtain the form (4) in Theorem 1.
Proof: Consider the following optimization problem
obtained from (3) without the constraint A(
√
w0)
T = 0:
max
A
M∑
i,j=1
1
2
(p1 − p2)i(p1 − p2)jAiATj
s.t.
1
2
M∑
i=1
pkiAiA
T
i ≤ k k = 1, 2
(34)
Let ∆i , (p1−p2)i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Furthermore, let α be
a row vector with entries αi for all i that |αi| is the Euclidean
norm of the ith row Ai of A. Let Ω denote the symmetric
matrix of the cosines of angles between the rows of A, such
that its entries Ωij , cos∠(Ai,Aj), i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, with
|Ωij | ≤ 1 for i 6= j and Ωij = 1 for i = j. Rewriting (34)
with these variables, we have
max
α,Ω
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
1
2
∆i∆j |αi‖αj |Ωij
s.t. Ωii = 1
|Ωij | ≤ 1 i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
1
2
M∑
i=1
pkiα
2
i ≤ k, k = 1, 2
(35)
Consider first the optimization over Ω. Since the objective
is linear in Ω and the feasible region of Ω is a hypercube,
(35) is a linear program whose optimal solution is at one of
the extreme points of the hypercube [9, Theorem 3.5.3], i.e.,
the optimal solution Ω∗ has entries |Ω∗i,j | = 1 for all i, j.
Thus, all the rows of an A maximizing (34) are parallel, and
therefore, the optimal solution A∗ of (34) is a rank-1 matrix.
In addition, from the objective function in (35), if the signs
of ∆1∆i and ∆1∆j are known for any i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,M},
the sign of ∆i∆j can be determined. Furthermore, maxi-
mizing the objective requires that Ωij has the same sign
as its coefficient ∆i∆j . Therefore, Ω∗ij = Ω
∗
1iΩ
∗
1j for all
i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,M}, i.e., Ω∗ has only M − 1 independent
entries Ω∗1j , j ∈ {2, . . . ,M} with Ω∗ii = 1 for all i.
Thus, we see that the optimization in (35) depends on
only M values of |αi|, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, and M − 1 signs of
Ω∗1i, i ∈ {2, . . . ,M}. Let v denote a unit norm vector with
no zero entry, and θ∗i for all i represent the direction of i
th
row of A with respect to v, such that Ω∗ij = θ
∗
i θ
∗
j , and the
ith row of A can be written as Ai = θ∗i |αi|v = αiv. The
optimization in (35) can now be written as a function of the
vector α as
max
α
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
1
2
(p1 − p2)i(p1 − p2)jαiαj
s.t.
1
2
M∑
i=1
p1iα
2
i ≤ 1
1
2
M∑
i=1
p2iα
2
i ≤ 2.
(36)
The optimal solution A∗ of (34) is then obtained from the
α∗ optimizing (36) as
A∗ = (α∗)Tv. (37)
Note that the optimal solution in (36) will yield both the
magnitude and sign of αi for all i. The v in (37) can be
chosen to satisfy
A∗(
√
w0)
T = (α∗)Tv(
√
w0)
T = 0. (38)
Thus, solving for α∗ in (4) leads to A∗ in (3) using (37)
and (38).
Remark 6: Knowing the optimal solution A∗ of (3), we
can obtain the optimal solution Θ∗ of the E-IT approxima-
tion problem (2) as Θ∗ = A∗
[√
w0
]
directly from (33).
C. Related Lemmas
To prove Theorem 2, we use the simplification in Theorem
1 along with two lemmas. The problem in (4) maximizes a
convex function over a convex feasible region, and thus, it is
not a convex program. However, we show how the problem
can be related to a convex program and we also obtain a
closed-form solution via the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2: The following convex program completely de-
termines the solutions of (4),
max
α
1
2
λ∗α(v∗)T
s.t.
1
2
α
[
p1
]
αT ≤ 1
1
2
α
[
p2
]
αT ≤ 2,
(39)
such that the optimal solutions of (4) are ±α∗ where α∗ is
the optimal solution of (39).
Proof: For the optimization problem in (4), the matrix
(p1−p2)T (p1−p2) is rank-1 with eigenvalue λ∗ = ‖p1−
p2‖2 and eigenvector v∗ = p1−p2‖p1−p2‖ . Thus, we have
1
2
α(p1 − p2)T (p1 − p2)αT = 1
2
λ∗(α(v∗)T )2,
leading to the following optimization problem
max
α
1
2
λ∗(α(v∗)T )2
s.t.
1
2
α
[
p1
]
αT ≤ 1
1
2
α
[
p2
]
αT ≤ 2
(40)
In (39) and (40), the two objective functions dependent on
α in the same manner, and their constraint functions are the
same, such that the optimal solution α∗ of (39) optimizes
(40). Since the objective and constraint functions of (40) are
even, −α∗ is feasible and gives the optimal value, i.e, −α∗
is also the optimal solution of (40). Thus, when α∗ is the
optimal solution of (39), ±α∗ are the optimal solutions of
(40), i.e., the optimal solutions of (4).
The optimal solution α∗ of (39) can be evaluated by
observing that at α∗, either one or both constraints are active.
The following lemma summarizes the optimal solution of
(39). From Lemma 2, one can then obtain the optimal
solution (4).
Lemma 3: The optimal solutions of (4) are given by:
1) if only the first constraint is active, i.e., 1 and 2
satisfy (9), the optimal solution α∗ is (10);
2) if only the second constraint is active, i.e., 1 and 2
satisfy (11), the optimal solution α∗ is (12);
3) when both constraints are active, the optimal solution
α∗ is (13) with η∗1 > 0 and η
∗
2 > 0 satisfying (14)
and (15).
Proof: From Lemma 2, to find the optimal solutions of
(4), it suffices to find the optimal solution to (39). In (39),
the objective function is linear in α. Since p1 and p2 are
interior points of probability simplex, both
[
p1
]
and
[
p2
]
are
positive definite, i.e., the two constraint functions are convex
in α. Thus, this is a convex program. In addition, there exists
α = 0 strictly satisfying the two constraints for positive 1
and 2, which means the constraints in (39) satisfy Slater’s
constraint qualification for positive 1 and 2 [10, Sec. 5.2.3].
Therefore, the convex program has zero duality gap, and the
optimal solutions are the solutions of the following Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [10, Sec. 5.5.3]:
∇{f0(α∗)+η∗1(1−f1(α∗))+η∗2(2−f2(α∗))}=0 (41a)
η∗1
(
1 − f1(α∗)
)
= 0 (41b)
η∗2
(
2 − f2(α∗)
)
= 0 (41c)
f1(α
∗) ≤ 1 (41d)
f2(α
∗) ≤ 2 (41e)
η∗1 ≥ 0 (41f)
η∗2 ≥ 0. (41g)
where f0, f1, and f2 represent the objective and two con-
straint functions of (39), respectively, α∗ is the optimal
solution of (39), and η∗1 and η
∗
2 are the optimal solutions
of the dual problem of (39). From (41a), we have
α∗ =
λ∗
2
v∗
(
η∗1
[
p1
]
+ η∗2
[
p2
])−1
. (42)
When η∗1 > 0 and η
∗
2 = 0, i.e., the first constraint is active,
the optimal solution α∗ of (39) is
α∗ =
λ∗
2
v∗
[
(η∗1p1)
−1], (43)
such that from (41b),
η∗1 =
√
(λ∗)2(v∗)T
[
(p1)−1
]
v∗
81
. (44)
Substituting η∗1 from (44) in (43), we obtain
α∗ =
√
21
v∗
[
(p1)−1
]
(v∗)T
v∗
[
(p1)
−1] (45)
In addition, for η∗2 = 0, (41e) is a strict inequality if and
only if 1 and 2 satisfy (9).
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Fig. 2: The relative utilities of W′ and W∗ for p1 =
(0.95, 0.05) and p2 = (0.55, 0.45).
When η∗1 = 0 and η
∗
2 > 0, with the same deduction based
on (41c) and (42), the optimal solution α∗ is
α∗ =
√
22
v∗
[
(p2)−1
]
(v∗)T
v∗
[
(p2)
−1]. (46)
and (41d) is a strictly inequality if and only if 1 and 2
satisfy (11).
When η∗1 > 0 and η
∗
2 > 0, the optimal solution α
∗ is
given by (42). From (41b) and (41c), we have f1(α∗) = 1
and f2(α∗) = 2, such that η∗1 and η
∗
2 are verified to satisfy
(14) and (15).
Finally, since (42), (45) and (46) yield α∗ for (39), the
optimal solutions for (4) are obtained by considering both
solutions ±α∗ as proved in the Lemma 2.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 presents the optimal privacy mechanism W′
for the approximation problem (2). Its proof is directly from
Theorem 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 as follows.
Proof: The optimal privacy mechanism W′ is a per-
turbation of W0 as W′ = W0 + Θ∗, where Θ∗ be the
optimal solution of the approximation problem (2). Since A∗
optimizes (3), we have Θ∗ = A∗
[√
w0
]
. From Theorem 1,
A∗ is given by A∗ = (α∗)Tv, where v is a unit norm M -
dimensional vector that is orthogonal to
√
w0, and α∗ is the
optimal solution of (4) as presented in Lemma 3. Therefore,
the optimal privacy mechanism W′ is (8).
VI. ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS
Theorem 2 provides an approximation, W′ in (8), of the
optimal privacy mechanism for binary hypothesis testing.
To evaluate the utility and privacy of W′, we compare the
values of D(p1W′‖p2W′) and D(p1W∗‖p2W∗), where
W∗ is the optimal solution of the original utility-privacy
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Fig. 3: The relative utilities of W′ and W∗ for p1 =
(0.05, 0.95) and p2 = (0.95, 0.05).
tradeoff problem in (1), when I(p1,W∗) and I(p2,W∗) are
bounded by 1 = 2 =  = max{I(p1,W′), I(p2,W′)}.
For the original utility-privacy tradeoff problem in (1),
the number of degrees of freedom in W is M(M − 1)
for M = N . When M = 3, finding the optimal privacy
mechanism W∗ by the exhaustive search for every single
value of  is computationally expensive, taking hours on a
desktop computer. Therefore, we only consider M = N = 2.
In this case, the probability distributions p1 and p2 are
Bernoulli. We choose w0 as the uniform Bernoulli distri-
bution (i.e., w0 = (0.5, 0.5)) because this yielded the best
approximations over all choices of (p1,p2) in our numerical
calculations. The uniform distribution for w0 yields the best
E-IT approximations. With this choice of w0, from (6) and
(7), v = ±(√0.5,−√0.5). In the following, we select four
pairs of Bernoulli distributions for the two source classes to
evaluate the approximation in a high privacy regime where
 ≤ 0.2 min{H(p1), H(p2)}.
In Fig. 2, the pair of probability distributions for the two
source classes are p1 = (0.95, 0.05) and p2 = (0.55, 0.45).
The approximation works well only in the region surrounded
by the black-dotted ellipse in the plot, where the statisti-
cal leakages I(pk,W′), k ∈ {1, 2}, are less than 0.5%
of the minimal information measure of the two sources,
namely min{H(p1), H(p2)}. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show that
the approximation performs excellently in the whole regime
of interest for the two pairs of probability distributions
p1 = (0.05, 0.95) and p2 = (0.95, 0.05) as well as p1 =
(0.45, 0.55) and p2 = (0.50, 0.50). In Fig. 5, the two source
classes are distributed according to p1 = (0.05, 0.95) and
p2 = (0.10, 0.90), respectively. The utilities for W′ and
W∗ are almost the same only in the region surrounded by the
black-dotted ellipse in the plot, where the statistical leakages
I(pk,W
′), k ∈ {1, 2}, are at most 0.1% of the minimal
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Fig. 4: The relative utilities of W′ and W∗ for p1 =
(0.45, 0.55) and p2 = (0.50, 0.50).
information measure of the two sources.
From Figs. 2–5, we deduce that for any two source
distributions, there exists a high privacy regime where the
Euclidean approximation is accurate. However, the specific
regime in which the approximation works well differs for
different pairs of source distributions. Specifically, when
both distributions are close to the uniform or when both
distributions are far apart from the uniform as well as each
other, the set of leakage values for which the Euclidean
approximation works well is larger. For the former, it can be
easily seen that the Euclidean approximations of the relative
entropy and mutual information are more accurate; for the
latter, intuitively, the individual approximation errors “cancel
out” so the overall approximation is accurate.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied the statistical inference problem of bi-
nary hypothesis testing under privacy constraints for large
datasets. The goal is to understand the guarantees that can
be made on the probabilities of error for any data sequence
when a mutual information based constraint on the leakage
of data from either source classes is restricted. Our model
seeks to understand if one can estimate the underlying source
class of a given dataset without revealing the respondents of
the data, i.e., those whose data is being used for testing. We
have shown that the resulting utility-privacy tradeoff problem
is one of determining the randomizing privacy mechanism
which maximizes the relative entropy (statistical utility)
between the output source classes while ensuring that the
mutual information based leakages for both source classes
are bounded. We have focused on the high privacy regime
and developed a Euclidean approximation of the tradeoff
problem; for this latter problem, we have shown that the
optimal mechanism can be viewed as a perturbation of a
10−3 10−2 10−1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
ǫ/min{H(p1), H(p2)}
D
(p
1
W
‖
p
2
W
)/
D
(p
1
‖
p
2
)
p1 = (0.05 0.95) vs p2 = (0.10 0.90)
 
 
EITObj
OrigOpt
Fig. 5: The relative utilities of W′ and W∗ for p1 =
(0.05, 0.95)T and p2 = (0.10, 0.90)T .
near perfect privacy mechanism where the perturbation is
computed as a solution to a convex optimization problem.
As is expected of statistical metrics such as relative
entropy and mutual information, our results reveal that the
randomizing mechanism perturbs the statistical outliers the
most in each source class; such a mechanism ensures both
utility (predominantly provided by the non-outliers) while
preserving privacy of those most vulnerable to inference
attacks. Finally, our results also suggest that it is possible
to achieve a positive error exponent even in the high privacy
regime admittedly with higher sample complexity (since the
exponent is small), i.e., likened to the moderate deviations
regime. This work can be extended to study multi-hypothesis
tests, and partial tests with statistical knowledge. One can
also study other privacy regimes (low, medium) in which
the tradeoff can be approximately quantified.
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